impose on naturalistic accounts of the mental are severe enough to provoke a serious doubt about the possibility of successful execution of the naturalistic project.
Informational semantics: a brief primer
Informational semantics is a view about the intentional contents of mental states and occurrences: its core idea is that the contents of items in the head are constituted by the nomic (i.e., lawful) relations these items bear to elements in the surrounding world. As the informational semanticist Jerry Fodor notes, it helps in thinking about this idea to have a "zerothorder, tinker-toy approximation to such a theory to play around with" (Fodor 1994, 4) . Let us say that occurrences of an inner state reliably correlate with a property or kind k iff the state occurs, as a matter of natural law, only when instances of k are present in one's surroundings.
So if a state of your brain is triggered, as a matter of law, only when dogs are around, occurrences of that state reliably correlate with the property of doghood. A simple version of informational semantics would hold that an inner occurrence's having the content dog consists in its reliably correlating with doghood.
2 Given the close relationship between laws and counterfactuals, we can equally understand the basic information-semantic idea to be that content is determined, in Fodor's phrase, by an inner state's "subjunctive career" (Fodor 1990a, 58 ). It's not enough that a given occurrence of a state happens to be caused by a dog; the occurrence has the content dog only if that state wouldn't occur if a dog weren't present.
It's easy to see what many naturalistically minded philosophers find compelling about this idea. We find striking, if circumstantial, evidence for it in the fact that our ascriptions of content to states of measuring instruments, such as thermometers, appear controlled by our beliefs about what those states lawfully depend upon. Our inclination to report, upon examining a thermometer, that the thermometer "says" it's such-and-such temperature outside seems closely connected to our awareness that the level of the mercury in the thermometer lawfully co-varies with the temperature. Further evidence of this sort can easily be adduced.
A second consideration in favor of informational semantics is that the head/world lawful dependencies out of which it seeks to construct mental content are not, at least on the face of it, a philosopher's fancy. It's an obvious fact of our lives, not a theory-driven conjecture of the philosopher, that a competent adult is a reliable detector of the comings and goings in her environment of a wide range of kinds of physical object. (Were it not so, reliabilism, informational semantics' close cousin in the epistemological sphere, would not be regarded as an anti-skeptical account of knowledge.) And it seems plausible that the pertinent notion of reliability can be cashed out in terms of the presence of nomic or counterfactual relations between our thoughts about k's and k's in the world. Contrast the situation of one of informational semantics' chief competitors, 'biosemantics'. Biosemantics aims to show that facts about the contents of structures in our brains reduce to facts about the evolutionary history of these structures (Millikan 1989 (Millikan /1991 . Setting aside the question of whether content possession could sensibly be regarded as constituted by such facts, the claim that structures in the brain were selected in the ways biosemanticists describe is no less speculative than the hypotheses advanced by evolutionary psychologists about the selectional pressures producing various social and interpersonal phenomena. Thus the advocate of biosemantics has double the work cut out for her as does the informational semanticist: she must not only defend the intelligibility of reducing content possession to her favored class of naturalistic fact; she must first convince us that this class is not empty.
As with any philosophical theory of anything, informational semantics faces its share of acknowledged difficulties. By far the most widely discussed stems from the fact, obvious in itself, that human beings can be wrong about what's going on around them. It's one thing to say that we are reliable detectors of ordinary kinds of object k; it's quite another to say that we are infallible detectors of k's. Such is clearly not the case: even the most sophisticated canine expert could, in sufficiently foggy conditions, think a dog was present when what's really there is, say, a wolf. It seems to follow that to whatever degree the expert's dog-thoughts nomically correlate with instantiations of the property being a dog, they correlate more strongly with instantiations of the disjunctive property being a dog or a wolf-in-foggy-conditions. 3 The challenge is to keep our information-semantic account of content from incorrectly assigning the disjunctive content to these thoughts.
A second worry is that informational semantics embodies an oversimplified conception of human cognition-in particular, a conception of our cognitive life as entirely given over to tracking changes in environmental conditions. In effect, the worry is that informational semantics conceives a human being in her cognitive aspect as nothing more than a sophisticated thermometer. A thermometer's 'attention' is fixed always on its immediate current environment;
to the extent that it can be said to entertain a content at all-say, the content 65°F-it is only in the context of a 'thought' about the current state of the environment-say, it's 65°F here now.
This limitation seems precisely what makes it plausible to see a thermometer's entertaining the content 65°F as lawfully correlating with the actual holding of that condition. Needless to say, our content-entertaining capacities are not similarly tethered. We may entertain thoughts wholly unprompted by what is going on around us at the time, we may entertain structurally complex thoughts involving multiple predicative or otherwise sub-propositional contents, and we may adopt an array of attitudes toward a given thought, including attitudes like desire and intention that exhibit what Searle calls a world-to-mind direction of fit. It is obscure on the face of it how these myriad ways of entertaining the content k could all be thought to reliably correlate with, or otherwise lawfully depend upon, k's in the world. The question is how to make such instances of content-entertaining susceptible to information-semantic treatment.
I mention these concerns by way of clearing the plate: I will not develop them further, nor discuss any of the ingenious proposals in the literature for bending the basic informational story to accommodate them (see, e.g., Stampe 1977 , Dretske 1981 , Fodor 1990b , and Fodor 1999 . The argument I will develop is targeted to the core information-semantic thesis that intentional content reduces, in whole or in part, to nomic dependency, and it applies to any proposed account of content that incorporates that thesis. It will aid exposition to take as our foil the simple version of informational semantics described above; once the argument is complete, it will be easy to show that it generalizes.
Informational semantics and intentional mechanisms
In light of the summary of informational semantics just given, the question posed in the title of this paper may seem inapt. Euthyphro's fallacy requires two (inconsistent) claims, and informational semantics, understood simply as the thesis that head/world nomic relations constitute intentional content, could at best serve as one member of such a pair. Nonetheless, the accusation is not unwarranted. For as we shall see, the additional claim needed to generate the inconsistency is annexed to the main information-semantic thesis by a number of prominent informational semanticists. Moreover, their endorsement of this claim is not a mere quirk on their part; as I shall discuss in section 7, the claim is probably unavoidable given the theoretical mindset that motivates informational semantics.
As we have noted, informational semantics seems right to presume the existence of nomic correlations between our thoughts and what they are about. The claim now at issue addresses the question of how we might expect to explain, to account for, their existence. Possibly some laws of nature are basic-that is, they cannot be explained in terms of anything else, and must be regarded as among the ultimate building blocks of the universe. But it would be absurd to suppose that laws connecting k-thoughts and k's belong to this category. It's surely not a ground-level law of the universe that, say, such-and-such neurophysiological state of my brain occurs only in the presence of dogs. When such a law obtains, there must be an answer to the question why it obtains. As Fodor puts it, "if informational semantics is right about the metaphysics of meaning, there must be mechanisms in virtue of which mental (-cum-neural) structures 'resonate' to doghood and Tuesdayhood" (Fodor 1998, 75) . To specify the mechanisms "in virtue of which" a law obtains-elsewhere Fodor speaks in the same spirit of the mechanisms that "implement" or "sustain" a law-is not simply to restate the law; it is to describe a further constellation of facts about the world that explains why the law holds. 4 Fodor's own suggestion-and this is the claim I will argue is incompatible with the main information-semantic thesis-is that k-thought/k nomic correlations are typically, if not invariably, implemented by intentional mechanisms, by mechanisms whose specification requires mention of intentional contents of states and occurrences of the person in question. Call this principle IM (for 'intentional mechanism'):
IM. Nomic correlations between k-thoughts and k's are implemented by intentional mechanisms.
What kind of intentional state or occurrence might figure in a mechanism implementing a k- (Fodor 1998, 77 Here again, Fodor finds the worry to be born of a conflation of distinct issues:
What meaning is, is a metaphysical question to which, I'm supposing, informational semantics is the answer. The current question, by contrast, is about not metaphysics but engineering: how are certain lawful mind-world correlations (the ones that informational semantics says are content-constituting) achieved and sustained? Answers to this engineering question can unquestion-beggingly appeal to the operation of semantic and intentional mechanisms, since 'semantic' and 'intentional' are presumed to be independently defined (Fodor 1998, 78-79) .
The metaphysical question is, "What are the relationships between internal items and external kinds that constitute content?" The engineering question is, "What mechanisms are responsible for the holding of these relationships?" Semantic naturalism is a view about what constitutes content, and as such imposes constraints on how we are to answer the metaphysical question. In particular, it requires that in answering that question we make no use of semantic or intentional vocabulary. But semantic naturalism imposes no constraint whatsoever on how we are to answer the engineering question. It is mute on the propriety of using semantic or intentional vocabulary in this context, just as it is mute on the propriety of using such vocabulary in any context at all other than when we are trying to give a metaphysical account of how content is constituted. Of course, as thoroughgoing naturalists, we would be astonished if all mentalistic phenomena didn't ultimately prove tractable to naturalistic analysis. But even if that weren't the case, and so answers to the engineering question had to make ineliminable use of intentional terminology, this would not by itself undermine the claim of informational semantics to have naturalized intentional content, for it would not change the fact that informational semantics'
answer to the metaphysical question can be put in naturalistic terms. The only way one might go astray here would be to explicitly link the two questions together in one's answer to the metaphysical question, by, say, identifying the content-constituting relations as those nomic relations that are sustained by mechanisms of a certain, intentionalistically described, sort. But informational semantics does not do this; as Fodor says, content on that view is "defined independently" of how we answer the engineering question.
Euthyphro's fallacy
Contrary to the claims of Fodor and his allies, there is an incompatibility between IM and informational semantics. But it's one we won't be in a position to see without bringing into view an important point about the logic of explanation. other hand, the argument will be shaped by a condition that will appear peripheral, at least at first glance, to our concept of an f-namely, the naturalist's constricted conception of the natural.
The basic idea of a naturalistic argument for a constitutive claim about intentional content is that possession of content must consist in g, because g is the closest anything comes in the 'natural'
world to having the features and playing the roles that we pre-philosophically take content to have and to play. Now, the point we need to take account of is the following. (Note that by "implemented law" in this formulation, I mean a non-basic law, a law implemented by a mechanism.)
S.
Socrates' principle. If it follows from a true constitutive claim that all f's are g's, then it's not an implemented law that all f's are g's.
If f-ness and g-ness are constitutively linked-if it is in virtue of what it is to be an f that an f is a g-there is no explaining the link between f-ness and g-ness in terms of an implementing mechanism. The fact that f-ness insures g-ness cannot be thus overdetermined, explained both as
an implication of what it is to be an f and as the result of an implementing mechanism.
Socrates' principle, once grasped, is nearly self-evident: to deny it could only bespeak a
failure to understand what a constitutive claim is supposed to be. It is precisely the point of taking something to be a constitutive fact (or to be implied by such a fact) that an explanation in terms of an implementing mechanism is regarded as inappropriate, indeed, as senseless.
Consider a famous example from Kripke (1980) . The fact that a substance's having the atomic number of 79 insures that it will be malleable is not a basic law of the universe; its holding can be explained by appeal to underlying processes governed by more fundamental laws of molecular chemistry and physics. If, with Kripke, we suppose that to be gold simply is to be the substance with the atomic number of 79, the same mechanisms will also explain why a substance's being gold insures that it will be malleable. However, if we adopt the more traditional supposition that being gold consists in possessing a complex of manifest and dispositional features, among them malleability, this explanation loses its cogency and point.
We still require an explanation of why a substance with the atomic number of 79 will be malleable. But however we answer this question, that answer will not be any part of an explanation of why gold is malleable. Being malleable is simply part of what it is to be gold.
Thus there is neither need nor place for an explanation of the connection between gold-ness and malleability in terms of physical or chemical laws and processes.
This point, by the way, does not imply that the identification of gold with the substance having the atomic number of 79, or other constitutive claims about natural-kind properties, cannot be part of a scientific theory. It is one of the revolutionary implications of the Kripkean view of natural kinds that a wide and central class of constitutive facts is to be discovered empirically, and so that scientists are in the business of advancing and defending claims about 'essences'. What this shows, if it is true, is that scientists in the special sciences engage in at least two different styles of explanation. They explain why implemented laws hold on the basis of mechanisms governed by other (and generally more fundamental) natural laws, and they explain what various natural-kind properties consist in. Presumably they proceed on both fronts simultaneously, tying together explanations of the two sorts in the course of developing a complete theory of their subject matter. The current point is only that the two sorts of explanation are mutually exclusive on a case-by-case basis. A given connection between properties may be said to hold either in virtue of an implementing mechanism or as an implication of the correct understanding of what constitutes a certain property, but it cannot sensibly be said to hold in virtue of both.
Socrates' principle holds regardless of the nature of the kinds or properties at issue. It holds even if the focus of the constitutive claim is an external property, a property whose holding of an object involves that object's standing in some relationship, such as a causal or nomic one, to other objects. Consider the property of being loved by the gods. As Socrates brought Euthyphro to realize, one cannot have it both ways. 10 One cannot say both that piety consists in being loved by the gods and that the gods love pious things because they are pious. The latter claim says that the correspondence between piety and god-belovedness is the upshot of a lawful or counterfactual connection between the two properties, sustained, presumably, by a capacity on the part of the gods to discern piety wherever it may be and a disposition to love it when they see it. But this picture is precisely what we rule out when we view the property of being pious as constituted by the property of being loved by the gods. Just as we cannot identify the property of being gold with the property of having the atomic number of 79 and suppose that a place still remains for an explanation of their correspondence in terms of physical or chemical processes, so we cannot take god-belovedness to constitute piety and suppose that a place still remains for an explanation of their correspondence in terms of the gods' powers of discernment or some other intervening mechanism. There is no room, as it were, for such a mechanism to occupy, no gap for it to bridge.
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As I have said, I take it that S, once clearly understood, is close to self-evident. However, Let us call this conclusion C1:
C1.
If informational semantics is true, it's not an implemented law that all kthoughts occur in the presence of k's.
Socrates' principle, informational semantics, and the representational view of the mind
If we're not careful, it might seem that C1 by itself is inconsistent with informational semantics, and it's important to see why this is not so.
Why might C1 by itself seem to conflict with informational semantics? Well, as we've noted, laws concerning the relationships between items in the head and middle-sized kinds in the world are not basic laws of the universe. So whenever k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood in the world, as informational semantics presumes they will, the law underwriting the correlation will be sustained by an implementing mechanism. But according to C1, if informational semantics is true, it can't be an implemented law that k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's.
And so we seem to have a problem.
But there is in fact no conflict here. What this argument misses is that sentences of the form, "f's reliably correlate with k-hood," are extensional: their truth-values are determined only by the extensions of the expressions they contain. To reliably correlate with k-hood, recall, is to belong to a type (for example, occurrences of a given inner state) such that it is a law that items of that type occur in the presence of k's. This definition does contain the operator, "it is a law that," but that operator's intensionality does not infect talk of reliable correlation itself. The reason is this:
although an item may be said to belong to a given type in virtue of one of its properties and not in virtue of others, it would be a serious confusion, akin to the sort Davidson famously diagnosed, to conclude that it belongs to that type only under certain descriptions. 12 It is in virtue of his having a certain gene, and not in virtue of his current spatial location, that the man in the next room is subsumed by a law that puts him at a high risk for cancer. But it is no less true that the man in the next room, described as such, is at a high risk for cancer.
The current point is exactly analogous. In order for f's to reliably correlate with k-hood, it's not necessary that it be a law that all f's occur in the presence of k's. It suffices that there be some predicate, "is an h," such that everything that is an f is an h, and it's a law that all h's occur in the presence of k's. 13 For example, suppose it's a law that elephant stampedes occur only in the presence of tigers. And suppose, as it happens, that all the interesting events I saw last week were elephant stampedes. Then all the interesting events I saw last week reliably correlated with tigerhood. But of course it's not itself a law of nature that all the interesting events I saw last week occurred in the presence of tigers. The predicate, "is an interesting event I saw last week,"
isn't the kind of predicate we'd expect to figure in a statement of natural law, and nothing in the example requires that it do so. The reason all the interesting events I saw last week reliably correlated with tigerhood is that these events were, in point of fact, elephant stampedes, and it's a law that all elephant stampedes occur in the presence of tigers.
The same goes for informational semantics. According to C1, the informational semanticist cannot suppose that it is an implemented law that all items with the content dog occur in the presence of dogs. But for all we've said so far, she doesn't have to. All we need is that there be some predicate, "is an h," such that items with the content dog are h's, and it's an implemented law that all h's occur in the presence of dogs. If these conditions are fulfilled, then items with the content dog reliably correlate with doghood without its being an implemented law that items with the content dog occur in the presence of dogs.
And there's no special difficulty in finding potential candidates to replace "is an h" in sentences like those above. All one needs is to endorse to the familiar view-what we might call the "representational view of the mind"-that mental content is borne by physical items, items individuated by their membership in one or another physical kind. Most commonly, the relevant kinds are said to be either neurophysiological or functional. Fodor, for example, proposes that the vehicles of mental content are tokenings of expressions in 'mentalese', in a language of thought with a functionally individuated syntax. 14 If we adopt Fodor's view, we have no difficulty in finding predicates to replace "is an h" in sentences like those above. The appropriate predicates are predicates of mentalese syntactic types. The idea is that there will be a mentalese expression, say, "DOG", such that it is a law that tokenings of "DOG" in my brain occur only in the presence of dogs. Thus "DOG" tokenings will reliably correlate with doghood.
In virtue of this fact, according to the simple version of informational semantics, tokenings of "DOG" will count as having the content dog. And so items with the content dog will reliably correlate with doghood. But it will not itself be an implemented law that items with the content dog occur only in the presence of dogs. The implemented law that underwrites the reliable correlation will be, rather, that tokenings of "DOG" occur only in the presence of dogs. And so we avoid conflict with C1.
Intentional mechanisms and cross-level implementation
Socrates' principle cannot by itself produce a difficulty for informational semantics. Nor, as we saw earlier, can we impugn the view solely on the basis of the fact (what I called IM) that thought/world reliable correlations are sustained by mechanisms involving the contents of states and occurrences on the part of the thinker. The trouble for informational semantics arises when we combine these considerations. To make the connection, we will need to venture one further premise (in a failure of imagination, I'll just call it "P" for "premise"):
P.
If k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood, and if this correlation is implemented by an intentional mechanism, then it is an implemented law that all k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's.
One way to think of P is as an instance of a general truism about what in the philosophy of science is sometimes called "cross-level" implementation. It's common to speak of laws and mechanisms as organized into levels-the chemical level, the neurophysiological level, the intentional level, and so on. What places a law or mechanism at the chemical level is that its expression requires chemical vocabulary. Now, there is no problem with the idea of a mechanism at one level sustaining a law at a different level; much scientific endeavor is devoted to explicating phenomena couched in the vocabulary of one level in terms of mechanisms operative at a more fundamental level-for example, explaining macroscopic laws in terms of microscopic processes. But for a cross-level implementation to occur, the candidate implementing mechanism must first sustain a law at its own level. Unless a microphysical process directly implements a microphysical law, it cannot indirectly implement a macrophysical law.
For example, suppose the macrophysical law that all M 1 's cause M 2 's is implemented by a microphysical process in which an event of type m 1 initiates a chain of events culminating in an event of type m 2 . For this to be so, it is necessary that the property of being an M 1 and the property of being an m 1 be either nomically or constitutively linked such that an occurrence of an M 1 suffices for an occurrence of an m 1 , and that the property of being an M 2 and the property of being an m 2 be either constitutively or nomically linked such that the occurrence of an m 2 suffices for the occurrence of an M 2 . Secondly, and this is the crucial point, it is necessary that the implementing mechanism sustain a law at its own level. The connection between M 1 and m 1 , and that between M 2 and m 2 , will obviously not help to explain why the macrophysical law holds Precisely the same goes for the intentional mechanisms that sustain head/world laws.
Intentional mechanisms occupy the intentional level, the level of mechanisms and laws whose specification requires mention of the intentional contents of beliefs or other content-bearing states and occurrences. Thus our truism about cross-level implementation implies that, if an intentional mechanism is to implement a law at any level, it must implement an intentional law.
Since the intentional mechanisms we are envisioning are geared in particular toward sustaining laws that underwrite k-thought/k reliable correlations, they must sustain laws of the form, "All kthoughts occur in the presence of k's." That is our P.
It is worth emphasizing that there is no implication here that intentional mechanisms cannot sustain non-intentional laws, such as neurophysiological or computational laws. The claim is just a conditional one: if an intentional mechanism is to sustain any law at all, it must sustain an intentional law.
The incompatibility of informational semantics and IM
All the pieces are in place. The argument can now be made very quickly.
We have already discussed how S yields C1. According to S, if it follows from a true constitutive claim that all f's are g's, it cannot be an implemented law that all f's are g's. The correspondence between these properties cannot be overdetermined in this way, explained both by what it is to be an f and by an intervening causal process or other mechanism. And so if informational semantics is right that it follows from the correct account of what constitutes possession of the mental content k that all thoughts with the content k occur in the presence of k's, then that correlation can't also be explained by an implementing mechanism. And that's C1:
C1.
If informational semantics is true, it is not an implemented law that all kthoughts occur in the presence of k's.
That completes the first part of the argument.
Now for the second. According to informational semantics, k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood. According to IM, if a person's k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood, this correlation is sustained by an intentional mechanism. And according to P, if k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood, and if this correlation is sustained by an intentional mechanism, then it is an implemented law that all k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's. Thus if informational semantics is right, it is an implemented law that all k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's. Call that C2:
C2.
If informational semantics is true, it is an implemented law that all k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's.
But if C1 and C2 are both true, then supposing that informational semantics is true produces a contradiction. It cannot both be an implemented law, and not be an implemented law, that all items with the content k occur in the presence of k's. I've argued that S and P are undeniable.
Short of abandoning IM-short, that is, of abandoning the idea that it is a person's knowledge of the environment around her that explains why she's reliable about what comes and goes within it-we must abandon our supposition that informational semantics is true.
How did Fodor and his peers end up committing a mistake as fundamental as Euthyphro's fallacy, and why has that mistake escaped notice? The answer, I think, is that the mistake emerges only when we combine considerations that are generally not scrutinized together. principle (S) in isolation, it will seem that the representational view of the mind is enough to keep informational semantics from running into conflict with the principle. Socrates' principle entails that we cannot suppose both that having the content k consists in reliably correlating with k-hood, and that it's an implemented law that k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's. But given the representational view of the mind, it would seem that the informational semanticist doesn't have to posit the existence of such laws. Instead, she can take reliable correlations between kthoughts and k's to be underwritten by laws couched at a physical level, say that of neurophysiology or of mentalese syntax.
It's when we take IM and Socrates' principle together that we get in trouble. For, as we have seen, accepting that thought/world correlations are sustained by intentional mechanisms requires us also to accept that the implemented laws underwriting these correlations are at the intentional level. And so the appeal to the representational view of the mind cannot help us. Accepting IM, the informational semanticist must accept that it's an implemented law that k-thoughts occur in the presence of k's. But given Socrates' principle, an informational semanticist cannot accept the existence of that implemented law, on pain of committing Euthyphro's fallacy.
As I noted at the outset, I have built the argument around a simple version of informational semantics. This allowed for a more transparent presentation of the problem. But it should be obvious that the argument generalizes to any version of informational semantics-that is, to any account of content that sees content as constituted, partly or wholly, by thought/world nomic relations. There are three ways in which an informational account of content might differ from the simple version considered here: 1) by appealing to nomic relationships other than that of strict reliable correlation-for example by using a weaker form of lawful dependency or by requiring 'world-head' rather than (or in addition to) 'head-world' reliability, 15 2) by restricting the class of inner items whose lawful relationships matter for the determination of content-for example by restricting the class to those occurrences of inner states that satisfy a naturalistically specified analogue of the idea of "observationally ideal" circumstances for identification of external kinds, 16 or 3) by casting an inner item's standing in a nomic relationship to k-ness as just one element in a package of conditions that must be satisfied if that item is to possess the content k-for example Fodor's wedding of the basic informational condition to a complicated requirement involving something he calls "asymmetric dependency". 17 It should be clear that no fine-tuning of the first two varieties will have any bearing on the issue raised in this paper. The relevant point is that changes in the nature or scope of the nomic correlation that is said to obtain between k-thoughts and k's will not affect the plausibility of the claim that the correlation is implemented intentionally. For example, intentional mechanisms are equally fit to explain reliable correlation in the world-thought direction as in the reverse: what I know about dogs helps explain why I don't mistake a dog for something else no less than it helps explain why I don't mistake something else for a dog. A parallel of the argument given here is then easily constructed.
And, of course, modifications of the third sort, in which further conditions are tacked on to the basic informational story, are irrelevant to the current difficulty. If it is our view that an inner item's having the content k consists in its reliably correlating with the presence of k's plus its satisfying some further condition X, then according to our view, it follows from a true constitutive claim that k-thoughts reliably correlate with k-hood. S applies as before.
Why informational semanticists are more or less stuck with IM
This completes the argument that informational semantics is incompatible with IM. Those informational semanticists who endorse IM commit Euthyphro's fallacy.
Establishing this incompatibility was the primary business of this paper. I believe that the argument just presented for this result is of interest for metaphysics and the naturalistic project in the philosophy of mind generally, and is not solely tied to our concern, such as it may be, with the prospects for informational semantics. But insofar as we are concerned with informational semantics' prospects, there is one more question we will want to address. Did Fodor et. al make a gratuitous error in endorsing IM? These informational semanticists seem to think they are committed to IM. 18 But knowing what we know now, why can't we just recant this view on their behalf?
The first thing to say on this question is that to reject IM across the board-to claim that kthought/k nomic correlations are never intentionally implemented-would put one in serious conflict with our ordinary, 'folk'-psychological thought. It is simply a fact about our everyday explanatory practice that, in at least a wide range of cases, we explain a person's capacity to reliably identify members of a kind-and so to have her thoughts about that kind reliably correlate with its local exemplifications-in terms of what she knows or believes about that kind.
Recall our birdwatcher. Why does the birdwatcher have the ability to reliably identify common grackles as such when I do not? Surely the answer the folk would give to this question is that the birdwatcher knows many things about the common grackle-about its appearance, habits and milieu-that I do not. For the more practically minded sort of birdwatcher, the whole point of accruing knowledge about a given bird species is that such knowledge enables reliable identifications of members of that species. If she didn't believe that knowledge could place this role, she wouldn't waste her time studying field guides. Other examples of this sort can easily be assembled. It doesn't take much reflection to realize that it is a pervasive assumption on the part of us folk that the accuracy and reliability of a person's identifications of kinds can be explained by what she knows or believes about those kinds.
Perhaps we folk are wrong on this score, but why should one think so? The only principled basis I can see for categorically denying these explanations would be a still more categorical A more moderate thought, one that might seem open to the informational semanticist even given her commitment to folk psychology, is that we don't have to accept IM in its full generality. As we turn our attention away from the fine-grained and sophisticated identifications of the birdwatcher to the layperson's identification of more familiar kinds and properties, the role of knowledge in sustaining reliability might start to seem less obvious. The possibility may seem to arise that there is a core set of kinds k such that k-thought/k nomic correlations are not mediated at all by any knowledge on the part of the thinker, and so may be presumed to be sustained by wholly non-intentional mechanisms. Cowie, for one, thinks that this is so: in the case of certain simple kinds, she suggests, our minds "resonate" to these kinds solely in virtue of unlearned and non-intentional "cognitive reflexes" (Cowie 1999, 134ff) . 19 If she is right, then maybe we can partially salvage informational semantics by restricting its scope to these cases. This is not Cowie's own view, of course: she holds with Fodor and the others that informational semantics has a general field of application. But if we suppose instead that content is constituted by head/world nomic relations only in those instances where the relations are not implemented by intentional mechanisms, we avoid conflict with IM. Second, the view ought not to accrue unwarranted credibility from being mistakenly viewed as a consequence of the idea that some concepts are innate. Cowie is moved by the "classical empiricist" thought that an initial set of concepts must be unlearned if any are to be learnable.
Given her information-semantic view of concept possession, that thought comes to this: "there are some properties we are born able to detect," and "it is our ability to resonate with these basic properties that presumably enables us to come to detect the rest" (Cowie 1999, 133) . Cowie suggests that in at least some cases, the mechanisms enabling our innate detecting capacities will be "cognitive reflexes", non-psychologically mediated dispositions to enter into given brain states in the presence of the kinds or properties in question. This thought in turn motivates a qualification to her claim (a version of IM) that "given an informational account of concepts, possessing a concept…will involve having knowledge of some kind about its object," the qualification being: "The only exception is concepts that we possess in virtue of our 'cognitive reflexes'" (Cowie 1999, 135) .
But who is the "we" Cowie is talking about here? Surely adult human beings, the fullfledged thinkers and subjects that any account of mental content must take as its primary concern. Thus Cowie has made an invalid inference: she moves directly from the premise that certain capacities are wholly non-intentionally implemented at birth to the conclusion that those capacities are wholly non-intentionally implemented at maturity. This conclusion is justified only given the further premise, unstated by Cowie, that no intentional mechanisms come to supplement the original "cognitive reflexes" at any stage in the maturity of the subject.
Once this additional premise is brought out into the open, it seems to me it ought not to survive scrutiny. There is a salient difference between the infant that detects certain "basic"
properties without relying on any knowledge of them and the adult that Cowie envisions as doing the same: namely, the adult has knowledge about these properties. Adults know things-many, many things-about colors, shapes and whatever other properties might strike one as "basic";
acquiring such knowledge, after all, is part of what maturation is. Since they have such knowledge, and since such knowledge is surely at least sometimes germane to the identification of instances of the properties in question, on what ground can we have confidence that the knowledge will not end up factoring in any mechanisms sustaining the relevant correlations? Of course, if infants have the capacity to reliably identify certain properties in the absence of any knowledge about them, then it's logically possible that adults do not rely on their knowledge either. But our concern is not with what is possible: it is with how thought/world correlations are actually sustained in the case of real live adult human beings. The reasonable thought is surely that they will use whatever tools they have at their disposal, knowledge being one such tool, and a prominent one at that.
These considerations tend toward the conclusion that we can avoid conflict between informational semantics and IM only by restricting the scope of the information-semantic account to the case of simple concepts when possessed by children or simple animals. As soon as a child reaches a developmental stage at which intentional mechanisms emerge to supplement innately given non-intentional "reflexes", the argument of this paper shows that concept possession can no longer be understood in information-semantic terms. The role this leaves for informational semantics seems too residual (not to mention ad hoc) to have much appeal.
Finally, one last way to try to avoid conflict with IM is to recast informational semantics as an account of subpersonal content. So long as one then resists the temptation to suppose that subpersonal psychological happenings constitute personal-level mental life, there will be no conflict with IM. But by the same token, the prospect of this recasting is irrelevant to our topic, since informational semantics so conceived is not an attempt to realize semantic naturalism. In any case, it's likely that an analogue for IM holds for subpersonal psychology with complete generality, at least if we assume anything like a computational framework. As Cummins notes, "The CTC [computational theory of cognition] has it (indeed, this was the fundamental claim of the so-called cognitive revolution) that cognitive systems are able to get into states that reliably covary with distal features because of their stored knowledge…A computational system of the sort favored by the CTC has no hope of arriving at the truth about even very common perceptual matters without the help of a formidable background of *knowledge [sic]" (1989, 44-45) .
A final word on Socrates' principle: constitutive vs. logical relations
Finally, the piece of unfinished business left over from section 3.
The primary obstacle to a clear understanding of S is presented by a familiar and, at least in the philosophy of mind, perennially tempting category mistake: the conflation of a thing with its description. This mistake bedevils discussion on the closely related topic of the "causal relevance" of dispositional and functional properties, and it will be helpful, before concluding, to briefly consider how the difficulty can shade over to obscure one's view of S as well.
In his well-known discussion of the question whether second-order (functional) properties can be "nomologically sufficient" for "the effects in terms of which they are defined" (and hence, on the "nomist conception of causal relevance", causally relevant to these effects), Ned
Block writes:
Consider dormitivity and sleep. The relation between the two is more like the relation between being a widow and having had a husband than that between, say, heat and expansion. If a pill is dormitive in the following sense: x is dormitive iff x has some property that causally guarantees…sleep if x is ingested-and I take the pill, it follows that I sleep. The fact that dormitivity is sufficient for sleep is perfectly intelligible in terms of this logical relation. What reason is there to suppose that there must also be a nomological relation between dormitivity and sleep? Now, I am very much not saying that a logical relation between properties precludes a nomological relation. This is as much a fallacy for properties as for Davidsonian token events…. [Properties can be] logically related under one set of descriptions, nomologically under another (1990, (157) (158) .
The bearing of these remarks on our topic at first seems clear. By "logically related properties", Block appears to mean something akin to what I would prefer to call "constitutively related properties", that is, properties whose correlating in some particular way is guaranteed by facts about what possession of one or the other of the properties consists in. Thus Block's initial remarks in the passage suggest he inclines toward a principle very similar to, and in fact stronger than, S, namely, that two properties cannot be both constitutively and nomically related. (In less ontologically committed terms: if it follows from what it is to be an f that all f's are g's, it's not a law that all f's are g's.) However, in the second part of the quoted passage, Block indicates that he doesn't wish to assert any such principle, that to do so, in fact, would be to commit a "fallacy". His final, considered position is that properties can be both nomically and "logically" related (although, he adds, it would be "amazing" if this were the usual case) (1990, 158) .
But what "fallacy" is supposed to be at work here, and what is its analogue for "Davidsonian token events"? Presumably Block is thinking of Davidson's famous response to A.I. Melden's view that a cause must be "logically distinct from the alleged effect" (Quoted at Davidson 1963 Davidson /1980 analytic or synthetic depends on how the events are described" (1963/1980, 14) . Block, who couples talk of "logically related properties" with an appeal to Davidson's point about logically related descriptions, would appear guilty of precisely this mistake. He contrives to dissent from S (or a near cousin of S) only by conflating the idea of a constitutive connection between properties with the idea of a logical relation between descriptions of properties.
Conclusion
What we come to believe about the surrounding world is partly governed by what we already believe about the surrounding world-this much 'belief holism' is indisputable, or, at any rate, indisputably a part of our commonsense psychology. In particular, if a person's thoughts about the comings and goings of certain objects correspond in a lawful way to the actual whereabouts of those objects, we will find at least part of the explanation for this phenomenon in what the person knows and believes about those objects and their environment. Fodor and other informational semanticists find no obstacle to their embracing this folk-psychological platitude.
They see no inconsistency in supposing both that lawful relationships to external kinds constitute content, and that lawful relationships between kinds and thoughts are sustained by the subject's beliefs and other contentful states. I have argued that the informational semanticists are mistaken. There is an inconsistency between these suppositions. The result is that informational semantics and commonsense psychology cannot be integrated; one of them must go. Since informational semantics cannot sensibly do without commonsense psychology, there is no real choice to be had.
I want to conclude by suggesting that we have reason to suspect that informational semantics' troubles, as developed here, are representative of a problem for the semanticnaturalistic project as such. A naturalistic account of content must satisfy two requirements: it must portray possession of intentional content as consisting in the possession of nonmentalistically specifiable properties, and it must not conflict in any radical way with our ordinary, pre-philosophical intentional psychology. No semantic naturalist would dispute the first condition; it is definitive of her enterprise. Nor, as we saw earlier, would any semantic naturalist dispute the second.
One intent of this discussion is to sow a seed of suspicion that there is something delusive in the very idea that an account of content could jointly honor these two commitments. In casting about for material to help discharge the reductive requirement, a semantic naturalist will look to non-mentalistically describable properties that contentful states and occurrences can manifestly be seen to have, and perhaps also to features credited to these states and occurrences by a biological or cognitive-scientific theory. The problem is not that ordinary psychology denies that contentful mental items have these features, or that it is inconsistent with ordinary psychology to suppose that they do. The threat of inconsistency arises rather when we take the step of supposing that the content of mental items reduces to some selection of these features. For in doing so, we cast as constitutive of content features and relationships that we were prephilosophically disposed to regard as at best accompaniments of content. Surely it should come as no surprise if, in reorganizing the conceptual landscape so fundamentally, we cannot help but upset some significant portion of our ordinary beliefs about the nature of minds. And if that is what happens, we fail to honor our second requirement, the requirement to leave ordinary psychology largely as is.
Left in the abstract, this worry is obviously inconclusive, and that may help explain why semantic naturalists have in general shown little sensitivity to the possibility of a danger of this kind. This paper is an attempt to show in detail how the worry plays out in one concrete, and prominent, case. Whether other forms of semantic naturalism are afflicted with similar problems is an open question. But our current result shows that it is certainly a live one.
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1 I shall expand upon and modify this formulation later on.
2 A few historical points bear brief mention here. 1. In his seminal account of informational semantics (1981/1999), Fred Dretske presents content as reducing to probabilistic rather than nomic head/world relationships. I follow later informational semanticists in opting instead for the latter. Some balk at the very idea of natural laws of the kind informational semanticists are thus led to posit, but I set such worries aside here. 2. Note that it is occurrences of a state, and not the state itself (except derivatively), that are defined as "reliably correlating" with a kind or property. Here I follow Dretske (1990, 820) in casting tokens, rather than types, as the items that explain what she does or thinks. It is hotly debated whether such explanations are in some distinctive sense normative, teleological, subjective, holistic, etc. We need not address these questions here (although see section 7). The examples in the text are just meant to serve as reminders of the kind of intentional explanations we might ordinarily give of thought/world nomic correlations, and it is not a condition on recognizing the intelligibility or plausibility of such specimens of intentional explanation that one have a comprehensive philosophical theory of that form of explanation. (Were it otherwise, day-to-day life would be a lot more difficult.)
Something similar goes for the examples' unexamined employment of the philosophically vexed notion of knowledge. The only feature of these and comparable explanations that bears on the current topic is that they are intentional: what matters is not that the explanations appeal to one's knowledge that such-and-such but that they appeal to one's knowledge that such-and-such. Thus it is of no significance for our discussion if, convinced on philosophical grounds that knowledge is not a "pure" mental state, we seek to reinterpret our ordinary explanatory appeals to knowledge in terms of ascriptions of beliefs plus some "external" conditions. The involvement of beliefs insures that the mechanisms descried in these explanations are still intentional. (But for compelling arguments that ascriptions of knowledge do play an essential and indecomposable role in intentional explanation, see the first three chapters of Williamson, 2000.) 6 It's especially noteworthy that Cowie, whose book is largely an unremitting attack on Fodorian philosophy of mind, concurs with Fodor in endorsing both informational semantics and
IM.
7 One source of their interest that I won't discuss is their belief that the marriage of informational semantics and IM opens the door to novel solutions to various problems in the philosophy of mind.
